Gender Wage Differences in West Germany: A Cohort Analysis by Fitzenberger, Bernd & Wunderlich, Gaby
Gender Wage Dierences in West Germany:
A Cohort Analysis
1
Bernd Fitzenberger
2
and Gaby Wunderlich
3
October 2000
Abstract:
A comprehensive descriptive analysis of gender wage dierences over a long time period
is missing for West Germany. Using an empirical approach which takes into account
explicitely changes of wage distributions for both males and females as well as life{
cycle and birth cohort eects, we go beyond conventional decomposition techniques
of the average gender wage gap. The paper provides some stylized facts of the level
and dynamics of the gender wage gap from 1975 { 1995. The empirical analysis is
based upon the IAB{Beschaftigtenstichprobe. Our ndings conrm the importance of
distributional eects relating to skill level and employment status. While life{cycle
wage growth is in general much lower for females compared to males, comparing their
estimated time trends implies that the gender wage gap has narrowed substantially in
the lower part of the wage distribution especially for low{ and medium{skilled females
but much less so in the upper part of the wage distribution. Surprisingly, we do not
nd any cohort eects for wages of female employees.
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1 Introduction
The wage structure in West Germany is often alleged to be fairly stable and, although
growing, labor force participation of women is still lower than in many other OECD
countries.
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At the same time, the formal skill level of the German work force is im-
proving very quickly with disproportionate gains for women. Finally, a lot of political
and social eorts have been undertaken to promote labor market chances of female
workers. Therefore, it is of great interest to investigate empirically the change of wage
dierences between male and female workers. Using the IAB{Beschaftigtenstichprobe,
a large micro data set for the time period from 1975 to 1995, this paper provides a
comprehensive descriptive analysis of the level and the dynamics of the gender wage
gap across the entire wage distribution taking into account life{cycle and birth cohort
eects.
Based on limited survey data, international comparative studies generally nd a slowly
but steadily declining gender wage gap in mean wages for West Germany (Blau and
Kahn 1996, Joshi and Paci 1998).
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Focussing on Germany Prey (1999) and Lauer
(2000) also nd that the gender wage gap is slightly decreasing and they emphasize
that the gender specic wage distribution in West Germany has not at all been stable
during the last decades. Therefore, the movements of the entire wage distributions of
males and females have to be taken into account (Blau and Kahn 1996, 1997). It is
not clear if wage distributions for dierent types of workers change in the same way.
Using data from the GSOEP (German Socio Economic Panel), Prey (1999) concludes
that the decline in the gender wage gap represents disproportionate wage growth in
the lower part of the wage distribution for both males and females (a related argument
is made by Hunt (1997) for East Germany). For the time period from 1975 to 1990,
Fitzenberger (1999, chapter 2) nds that, both overall as well as within groups of the
same formal skill level, wage dispersion has increased for full{time working males and
decreased for full{time working females. At the same time, a much stronger trend
towards skill upgrading is observed for females compared to males.
Our brief review of the literature reveals that a comprehensive descriptive analysis of
gender wage dierences for West Germany over a long time period is missing. Such
an analysis should go beyond decomposition techniques which are mostly restricted
to \explain" gender specic dierences in mean wages. The observation of dierences
in wage growth at dierent points of the wage distribution suggests a more detailed
analysis. Such distributional eects could explain why decomposition exercises are
often plagued by identifying strong counteracting eects which are associated with
fairly small aggregate changes (Prey 1999, Lauer 2000). Our intention is to investigate
the dierences in the wage distributions for male and female workers of the same age
and the same formal skill level and how these dierences change over time.
4
In 1995 the labor force participation rate of women (age 25-54) amounts to 73.2% and the
employment{population ratio to 67.6%, see OECD (1999).
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In contrast, Weiler (1997) presents descriptive evidence that gender specic wage dierentials in
West Germany have not changed since 1978. Her analysis is based on data from German ocial
statistics for groupings in pay schedules according to the formal requirements of a job. It is not
straight forward to relate these wage data to the evidence based on individual data.
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In particular, our analysis addresses the following issues:
 How do wages dier over the life{cycle between male and female workers? Do
women benet less from wage growth over the life{cycle possibly due to inter-
ruptions in the accumulation of human capital during the child rearing phase or
due to the lack of career possibilities?
 If orientations of women have changed towards a higher labor force participation
and higher formal skill levels, one should observe a narrowing gender wage gap.
Such changes are likely to have a stronger eect on regular full{time jobs com-
pared to part{time jobs. In addition, birth cohort eects on female wages could
be operating such that younger cohorts benet disportionately from a reduction
of the gender wage gap since younger cohorts have better chances to obtain higher
formal skill levels and are more work{oriented.
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 If social eorts (e.g. union policies) to improve the relative earnings of women
result in an improvement of the relative wage position of female workers (reduc-
tion of the gender wage gap), it would again be likely that those policies have
a stronger eect on regular full{time jobs compared to part{time jobs since the
latter are less institutionally regulated. Do women in part{time jobs experience
a reduction in the gender wage gap to the same extent as women in full{time
jobs ?
 Do the data conrm that the disproportionate increase of the formal skill level
of females is associated with a reduction of the gender wage gap?
The empirical strategy of the paper is to estimate a parsimonious descriptive model
describing life{cycle, birth cohort, and time eects on wages. Various tests are per-
formed as to whether cohort eects exist and whether time trends are uniform across
the wage distribution. The dierences in the estimated time trends are interpreted
as changes in the gender wage gap between male and female workers of the same age
and the same formal skill level. Our ndings should be viewed as stylized facts on the
gender wage gap in West Germany over the time period from 1975 to 1995. Despite
the descriptive nature of the analysis, our ndings contradict some simple hypotheses
regarding the nature and the dynamics of the gender wage gap.
Our main results are the following: (i) We do not nd cohort eects for wages of
female workers. (ii) In general, wage trends for part{time working females are quite
dierent from full{time working females. (iii) For all types of workers, we can identify
a uniform time trend across all birth cohorts. (iv) Contrasting the estimated time
trends, the gender wage gap has narrowed substantially in the lower part of the wage
distribution for full{ and part{time working females (especially for low{ and medium{
skilled women). Wage trends have been much less benecial for high{skilled females.
(v) Wage growth over the life{cycle is much lower for females compared to males (it may
even be negative in the lower part of the wage distribution) and the life{cycle proles
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For cohort eects on wages of West German females see Boockmann/Steiner (2000) and
Steiner/Lauer (2000). Their results are not directly comparable to ours because of dierent data
and methods.
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appear not to have changed over time. (vi) Our ndings conrm the importance of
distributional eects.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data
(\IAB{Beschaftigtenstichprobe") used for the empirical analysis. Some basic descrip-
tive evidence on the gender wage gap in the entire distribution is presented in section
3. Our empirical framework to test for uniformity of wage trends and to identify cohort
eects is developed in section 4. Making use of this framework, section 5 describes the
main empirical results obtained in this paper. As a conclusion, section 6 interprets
the empirical results. The nal appendix comprises tables and gures referred to when
discussing the empirical results.
2 Data
Our analysis is based on the new release of the I
A
BS (\IAB{Beschaftigtenstichprobe")
for the time period from 1975 to 1995 for West Germany. The I
A
BS is a 1% ran-
dom sample from German social security accounts which has only recently been made
available by the research institute of the Federal Employment Service (\Institut fur
Arbeitsmarkt{ und Berufsforschung") in Nurnberg. The main features of the data set
and a users' guide can be found in Bender et al. (1996).
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Social security contributions
are mandatory for employees who earn more than a minimum wage threshold and who
are working regularly. The main exceptions are civil servants who do not pay any
social security contributions. Further exclusions from the mandatory contributions are
students who work less than 20 hours a week on a regular basis or less than 6 weeks
full{time. About 80% of the German employees are covered by this mandatory pension
system.
We restrict the analysis to workers who are between 25 and 55 years old to avoid
interference with unnished education and early retirement. Workers are grouped by
their skills according to the following formal education levels given in the I
A
BS:
(U) without a vocational training degree (low{skilled)
(M) with a vocational training degree (medium{skilled)
(H) with a technical college (\Fachhochschule")
or a university degree (high{skilled)
There are quite a number of missings for the skill variable in the data (around 3.3%
of all employment spells for males, 3.7% for full{time females, and 7.5% for part{time
females). However, these missings can be reduced using the skill information recorded
in previous spells of the same individual or, if information from previous spells is not
available, in future employment spells assuming that the skill level does not change
after the age of 25 years. This correction reduces the share of employment spells with
7
This guide describes the rst release of the I
A
BS comprising the time period 1975 to 1990. The
construction of the data set is basically the same for the two time periods.
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missing skill information to 2.13% for males, 2.52% for full{time females, and 6.1% for
part{time females.
The dataset does not include information on hours worked. However, one can dis-
tinguish between full{time and part{time employment and, for spells in part{time
employment, it is recorded whether the hours of work are either less (less or equal) or
more than half of the regular working time. Regarding gender and employment status,
we consider three groups of workers:
 full{time working males,
 full{time working females, and
 females working part{time,
as it turns out that only a negligeable proportion of males is working part{time. For
females working part{time, we also record in each cell the share of those working less
than half of the regular working time.
From the I
A
BS, we construct wage and employment information by cells dened by
skill, gender, and employment status. The basic information in the I
A
BS consists of
social security insurance spells comprising the starting point and the end of an em-
ployment spell and the average daily gross wage (excluding employers' contributions).
The daily gross wage is censored from above and truncated from below. If the wage
is above the upper social security threshold (\Beitragsbemessungsgrenze"), the daily
social security threshold is reported instead. If the wage is below the lower social se-
curity threshold, the employee does not have to pay social security contribution and
therefore, does not appear in the data. The level of both thresholds changes annually.
A wage below the lower threshold level implies that employment is only part{time and
typically much less than half of the regular working time.
Because of censoring from above, we use quantiles of daily gross wages. For our analysis,
an annual wage observation is calculated as the weighted average of the wage obser-
vation of the individual for all spells within one year where the spell length is used as
the weight. For the subsequent calculations, the annual wage observation is weighted
by the total employment spell length as percentage of the whole year. These weights
are used to calculate the 20%{, 50%{, and 80%{quantiles of wages { as long as these
quantiles are not censored { and raw employment weights for all individuals in cells
dened by skill group, gender, employment status, age, or year. With multiple spells
(jobs) at the same time, cf. Bender et al. (1996, p. 74), we take the sum of the daily
wages across spells as the wage observation and treat the individual as full{employed.
Without referring to this every time in this study, real wages are deated by the price
index for aggregate private consumption.
A problem of the data is the structural break in wages between 1983 and 1984, cf.
Steiner and Wagner (1998). Over time, the income components being subject to social
security tax were extended, cf. Bender et al. (1996, p. 15). In particular, starting in 1984
one{time payments to the employee had to be taxed. Steiner and Wagner note that this
results in a considerable spurious increase in earnings inequality due to the structural
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break in the data. To correct for this problem, we use the procedure suggested in
Fitzenberger (1999, appendix). This procedure estimates the spurious wage increase
in the upper part of the wage distribution between 1983 and 1984. Then, individual
wages before 1984 are corrected based on the position of each worker in the marginal
distribution of wages.
3 Descriptive Evidence
This section presents the basic trends in wages for full{time working males, and for
full{time and part{time working females over the time period from 1975 to 1995. At
this point, we develop an overall picture about wage trends over this period. Therefore
we do not control for participation changes and composition bias, which are presumably
serious problems for females in general and even more for part{time working females.
Figure 1 (see appendix for graphical illustrations) depicts wage trends for men as well
as for full{ and part{time working women at three quantiles (20%, 50%, and 80%) of
the unconditional wage distribution. The results include observations with missing skill
information but there are basically no changes if missings are excluded. It is clearly
visible that log real wages of males and females exhibit a dierent trend from 1975 to
1995 (see graphs to the right of gure 1 for growth rates of log real wages).
The increasing inequality of the male wage distribution contrasts sharply to the nearly
constant or even slightly decreasing inequality for females. The dierence between the
20%{ and the 80%{quantile of the male wage distribution increases over time and has
grown by 15% in 1995 compared to 1975. Most of the increase in inequality occurs in the
upper part of the distribution. While men face increasing inequality, full{time working
females experience a compression. They gain most at the 20%{quantile, resulting in a
decrease of inequality from below, and both the median and 80%{quantile move in a
nearly parallel fashion. A slightly dierent picture emerges for the case of female part{
timers. The 80%{quantile starts to grow disproportionately in the middle of the 1980's
{ whereas during the time before the 20%{quantile grows fastest. Thus the trend
for female part{timers has reversed from wage compression until 1985 to increasing
inequality afterwards.
The growth rate of log real wages is almost highest for males at the 80%{quantile
(35%), but wage growth of the lowest quantile of full{time working females is even
a little bit higher than the wage growth of the highest quantile of full{time males
and also that of part{time females. The graphs show further that males in the lower
part of the distribution experienced the lowest wage growth of about 20% and 25%
respectively, whereas the 20%{quantile of full{time women exhibits the strongest rise
in real wage of approximately 36%. As far as the 80%{quantiles of the female wage
distributions are concerned, it is obvious that their wage growth diers, if at all, only
slightly from the growth of the 80%{quantile of the male wages.
The rst impression is therefore that, on the one hand, the unconditional wage distrib-
ution of men became more unequal while the distribution of full{time females became
more compressed, and that, on the other hand, the lower quantiles of full{ and part{
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time working women catched up over time compared to the wage development of males
in the lower part of the distribution.
It will be investigated next to what extent the unconditional wage distributions absorb
wage dierences by the aforementioned skill levels: low{skilled (U), medium{skilled
(M), and high{skilled (H).
A restriction of the data is the censoring of the daily wage at the social security
threshold which is particularly important for high{skilled males. In this case, it is
not possible to plot the log real wages for the 50%{ and 80%{quantiles. For high{
skilled full{time females the 80%{quantile is censored as well, but only for the rst
seven years of the observation period. Furthermore, we do not put much emphasis
on high{skilled part{time working women because of the heterogeneity and the highly
irregular wage patterns for that group.
The development, which we have seen in unconditional log real wages, varies much
more if we control for skill level (gure 2, gure 3). For males, inequality is clearly
related to skill level. The higher the skill level, the higher the increase in inequality.
The picture for full{time females looks somewhat dierent: Wages have been growing
very strongly at the 20%{quantile of low{ and medium{skilled female full{timers. The
message is the same for female part{timers: Here we nd a disproportionate increase
of wages at the 20%{quantile of the high{skilled and increasing inequality of wages for
medium{ and low{skilled female part{timers since the middle of the 1980's. Summing
up, we nd compression in the case of female full{timers (U) and (M) as well as female
part{timers (H) and increasing inequality for males in general, female part{timers (U)
and (M) as well as full{timers (H).
The graphs show additionally that in general wage growths for all groups is positive
over the 20 years as a whole but that all plots have a more or less pronounced pattern
or cyclical "megatrend" in common: the growth rate of real wages is positive from
1975 to 1980, nearly constant or even negative until 1985 and again positive until
approximately 1991/92. Then follows again a short period of stagnation and afterwards
a further increase. Especially for the rst 10 to 15 years of the observed time period
this pattern is more or less visible in almost all plots.
Real wages increase over time at all quantiles and it is apparent that for (1) medium{
skilled men from 1975 until 1995 and (2) part{time working women as well as (3) low{
skilled men from the end of the 1980's on, the growth of real wages is higher at higher
quantiles. Thus, there is a trend towards higher overall inequality in wages. But while
this development is not very strong both for low{ and medium{skilled female part{
timers, for whom inequality rose only slightly between the 50%{ and 80%{quantiles,
it is most relevant for medium{skilled males over the whole period (and probably for
the high{skilled because the wage growth of the 20%{quantile of those males is the
lowest of all groups and the upper quantiles are at least as high as the social security
threshold). The opposite has happened for female full{timers at low and medium skill
level. While for medium{skilled full{time females the distribution from the beginning
in 1975 became steadily more equal, this trend started in the middle of the 1980's for
the low{skilled.
These ndings are, at least for men, in sharp contrast to ndings in OECD (1993,
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1996) for West Germany based on the German Socioeconomic Panel (see also Steiner
and Wagner (1998) and Moller (1999)). The OECD studies argue that during the
second half of the 1980's wage inequality was slightly decreasing and this compression
continued into the 1990's. Our results are quite close in spirit to the ndings in Blau
and Kahn (1996), who argue that there is substantially more compression of wages at
the bottom of the wage distribution in countries like West Germany compared to the
United States due to dierent institutional settings. From a dynamic perspective, it is
quite conceivable that a trend towards higher inequality in West Germany is mitigated
in the lower part but not in the upper part of the distribution.
The important question to be asked is whether and by how much female wages have
catched up compared to male wages over time. Figure 4 oers descriptive evidence
that low{ and medium{skilled female full{ and part{timers mainly in the lower part of
the wage distribution have made some gains. The gure shows the dierence in log real
wage growth between women and men of the same skill group at the same quantiles
of the wage distribution. High{skilled females are compared to medium{skilled males
due to censoring of wages in the case of high{skilled males.
The picture is twofold: from 1975 until the early 1980's women lose some ground or
cannot improve their wage position very much in almost all cases. In 1985 we see on
average a 5% loss for low{ and medium{skilled full{ and part{timers, except at the
20%{quantile, compared to 1975. The loss of high{skilled full{ and part{timers is even
worse and amounts to nearly 15% in the extreme. In the mid 1980's there seems to be
a turnaround. The trend is mostly positive after 1985/86 so that, in most cases, the
status quo of 1975 can be reestablished or exceeded, respectively. As far as the whole
time span is concerned the strongest improvement is found at the 20%{quantile. The
gain at the 20%{quantile amounts to almost 10% for low{skilled full{ and part{time
working women, and medium{skilled working women compared to men of the same
skill level. Fulltime working women of medium skill level improved their position a
little bit more than 10%. The same pattern shows up at the 50%{quantile but on a
lower level of nearly 5%. For high{skilled women, full{ and part{timers, the picture is
worse. Summig up the trends for all quantiles of full{ and part{timers, except for the
20%{quantile of the part{timers, one can state that all seem to be worse o in 1995
than in 1975 in spite of the upward trend starting in the middle of the 1980's.
Low skilled female part{timers show the most uniform development over all quantiles
compared to the other groups. Those women lost in the rst half of the observation
period 5% but catched up by 10% in the second half.
Summarizing, one can conclude that there has been a rise in overall wage inequality
from 1975 to 1995 for men, but a compression of the distribution for women. However,
these changes in inequality have not at all been uniform. Quite complex changes can
be observed within and across skill groups and across males and females of dierent
employment status. Therefore our subsequent analysis tries to shed more light on
the wage trends across and within skill groups separately for men and full{time and
part{time working women. We will investigate how much of the observed changes can
be attributed to composition eects. Furthermore, we will show how wage positions
of women have changed over time in direct comparison to male workers by means of
comparing their estimated macro time trends.
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4 Empirical Framework
This section presents the empirical framework to investigate the movement of the entire
wage distribution for synthetic cohorts over time. A cohort is dened by the year of
birth of the worker. Regarding the rising labor force participation rates of females, it
is often argued that the behavior of females has changed such that younger cohorts are
more attached to the labor market.
In order to decompose between{ and within{shifts in the wage distribution, we esti-
mate various quantile regressions. Testing for uniformity across cohorts and across
quantiles for given cohorts allows to investigate, whether the entire wage distribution
has shifted uniformly over time. Alternatively, it could be the case that wage trends
dier across cohorts indicating the presence of \cohort eects" and by quantiles indi-
cating a trend towards increasing or decreasing within group wage dispersion. Under
certain conditions, as will be made precise in the following, a cohort eect designates
a movement of the entire life{cycle wage prole for a given cohort relative to other
cohorts. In providing a parsimonious representation of trends in the entire wage distri-
bution, we are able to pin down precisely the dierences in wage trends across groups
of workers dened by gender, skill level, and employment status. Basing the estimates
on all years of observation, we are not restricted to a pointwise comparison of one{
dimensional summary measures of average wage dierences in two particular years as
it is often done in the literature. In light of the descriptive evidence presented in the
previous section, we explicitly take into account the possibility that wage dierences
are sensitive to the business cycle as well as that they dier by age and by the position
in the wage distribution.
Due to the inherent identication problem between age, cohort, and time eects on
wages, see Heckman and Robb (1985), wage proles based on cross{section relation-
ships between age and wages over a sequence of years and movements of life{cycle
wage proles faced by successive cohorts are statistically indistinguishable. However,
considering the wage growth experienced by a particular cohort over time or over age
(both movements are of course the same), it can be tested whether apart from the
dierential age eect dierent cohorts exhibit the same time trend.
The basic version of the empirical framework described in this section was rst devel-
oped by MaCurdy and Mroz (1995) for the context of trends in median wages for male
workers in the United States. Variants of this framework are applied in Fitzenberger
et al. (1995) for West Germany and in Gosling et al. (1996) for the UK. Fitzenberger
(1999, chapter 3) extends the framework to study uniformity of wage trends across
the entire distribution in the context of estimating quantile regressions for full{time
working males in West Germany based on a shorter time period than considered in
this study.
4.1 Characterization of Wage Proles
We denote the age of an employee by  and the calendar time by t. A cohort c can
be dened by the year of birth. The variables age, cohort and calendar year are linked
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by the relation t = c + . Studies of wage trends often investigate movements of
\age{earnings proles"
8
ln[w(t; )] = f(t; ) + u :(1)
The deterministic function f measures the systematic variation in wages and u reects
cyclical or transitory phenomena. For a xed year t, the function f(t; ) yields the
conventional cross{section wage proles. Movements of f as a function of t describe
how cross{section wage proles shift over time. The cross{sectional relation f as a
function of age does not describe \life{cycle" wage growth for any cohort or, put
dierently, the cross{section relation may very well be the result of \cohort eects". In
fact, \cohort{earnings proles" are statistically indistinguishable from \age{earnings
proles". Wage proles can also be expressed as a function of cohort and age
g(c; )  g(t  ;)  f(t; )(2)
where the deterministic function g describes how age{earnings proles dier across
cohorts. Holding age constant, g(c; ) describes the proles of wages earned by dif-
ferent cohorts over time. Holding the cohort constant yields the prole experienced
by a specic cohort over time and age. The latter is referred to as the \life{cycle
prole", because it reects the wage movements over the life{cycle of a given cohort.
Again this prole reects two eects such that life{cycle wage growth due to aging and
intertemporal shifts in wages are indistinguishable.
The dierent parameterizations g(c; ) and f(t; ) are equivalent representations of
the same wage prole. Without further assumptions, \pure life{cycle eects" due to
aging or \pure cohort eects" cannot be identied. Focusing on wage trends for a given
cohort over time, we use the cohort representation of wage proles as the perspective
of our analysis.
4.2 Testing for Uniform Wage Growth
Our analysis investigates whether wage trends are uniform across cohorts in the sense
that every cohort experiences the same time trend in wages and the same age-specic
wage growth. The latter can be attributed to labor market experience and is inter-
preted here as a life{cycle eect. Despite the identication issues discussed above,
the existence of a uniform time trend across cohorts is a testable implication in the
framework presented here. If such a uniform time trend is found, it is designated as
the macroeconomic wage trend for the group of workers considered.
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However, as will
be seen from the empirical results reported in the following, these uniform time trends
dier by skill level, gender, and employment status.
Two notions of wage growth prove useful: First, wage growth for a given cohort in
the labor market over time (\Insider Wage Growth"), and second, wage growth over
time experienced by successive cohorts when entering the labor market (\Entry Wage
8
Alternatively, researchers often describe trends in \experience{earnings proles". Basically, the
identication issue discussed in the following also applies to potential experience being constructed as
\age { years of schooling { 6".
9
If no uniform trend is found, the average across age groups combines age, time, and cohort eects.
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Growth"). Insider wage growth is given by
@g
@t
j
c
=
@g
@
j
c
 g

(c; )  g

;(3)
comprising the simultaneous change of time and age. Alternatively, holding age con-
stant yields the change of wages earned by dierent cohorts at specic ages. For the
age at labor market entry, 
e
, entry wage growth is given by
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@t
j
=
e
=
@g
@c
j
=
e
 g
c
(c; 
e
) = g
c
(t  
e
; 
e
)  e(t) ;(4)
again comprising two eects, namely a change of cohort and time.
Now, two testable separability conditions implying uniformity of wage trends can be
introduced. If wage growth can be characterized as the sum of a pure aging eect and
a pure time eect in the following way
g

= a() + b(t) = a() + b(c+ );(5)
then life{cycle wage growth is independent of the calendar year t. This condition is
designated as the \uniform insider wage growth hypothesis" which we denote by H
UI
.
It implies that each cohort faces the same wage growth over the life{cycle due to aging
a() and that economy wide shifts b(t) are common to all cohorts in the same year but
they occur at dierent points during the life{cycle of each cohort. If the separability
condition (5) holds, we can construct a \life{cycle wage prole" independently of the
calendar year and a macroeconomic time trend independently of age. Condition (5) is
violated if interaction terms of  and t enter the specication of g

.
Integrating back the derivative condition (5) with respect to  yields an additive form
for the systematic component of the wage function g(c; ):
g(c; ) = G +K(c) +A() +B(c+ )(6)
where G+K(c) is the cohort specic constant of integration. At a given point in time,
the wages of cohorts dier only by the age{eect, given by A(), and by a cohort{
specic level, given by K(c). The \uniform insider wage growth hypothesis" H
UI
can
be tested by investigating whether \interaction terms" R(; t) enter specication (6)
which are constructed as integrals of interaction terms of  and t in g

.
If, in addition to uniform wage growth across cohorts, the growth of entry wages equals
the macroeconomic wage growth
e(t) = b(t)(7)
a stronger hypothesis can be formulated which we designate as the \uniform wage
growth hypothesis" denoted as H
U
. Under this hypothesis, the life{cycle prole of
each new labor market cohort is a parallel shift of the prole of the previous cohort
corresponding to the uniform time trend b(t) for all cohorts already in the labor market.
Again, this is a testable implication. Given specication (6), condition (7) implies that
K(c) is equal to zero for the cohorts entering the labor market during the period of
observation.
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4.3 Empirical Implementation
In order to describe wage proles and to test the implications of uniform insider and
entry wage growth, we specify the wage function g(c; ) using a fairly exible functional
form, which nests the dierent hypotheses about uniform wage growth as special cases.
A general regression equation for the wage of individual i in the sample year t can be
written as:
ln[w
i;t
] = g(c
i
; 
i;t
) + u
t
+ u
i;t
(8)
where 
i;t
and c
i
denote the age of individual i at time t and the cohort of individual
i, respectively. We further decompose the error term into a period specic xed eect
u
t
and a stochastic error term u
it
. In the empirical analysis, we take the age of 25
years as the entry age into the labor market and we dene  = (age   25)=10 and
therefore 
e
= 0. Analogously, since the observation period starts in 1975, we dene
time t = (calendar year   1975)=10. For each cohort, c corresponds to the time t at
which  equals zero. For the cohort of age 25 in the year 1975, c equals zero and older
cohorts have negative values for c.
As a exible empirical approximation of the wage prole imposing the hypothesis of
uniform insider wage growth, we use polynomials in age, cohort, and time:
A() = A
1
+A
(2)
() = A
1
 +A
2

2
+A
3

3
(9)
B(t) = B
1
t+B
(2)
(t) = B
1
t+B
2
t
2
+B
3
t
3
+B
4
t
4
+B
5
t
5
K(c) = K
1
c+ (1  )K
b
(c) + K
a
(c)
with  = 1 for c  0 and  = 0 else .
The choice of polynomials is justied since the analysis does not intend to forecast
wages outside the observed sample. For older cohorts, entering before the sample
period (i.e. before 1975), the cohort term takes the form K(c) = K
1
c+K
b
(c) and for
younger cohorts, entering during the sample period (i.e. after 1975), the cohort term
is K(c) = K
1
c +K
a
(c), where:
K
b
(c) = K
b2
c
2
+K
b3
c
3
and K
a
(c) = K
a2
c
2
:
Since c takes the value zero for cohorts of age 25 in 1975, K(c) is zero for this specic
cohort and the cohort eects are centered around this cohort.
We include year dummies which are orthogonalized with respect to B(t) in order to es-
timate period specic xed eects u
t
. The specication of the estimated wage function
is augmented by orthogonalized time dummies
P
1995 N
b
 1
i=1975

i
Y D
i
, where N
b
is the order
of the time polynomial B(t), and the 
i
's are the coecients of the orthogonalized year
dummies Y D
i
. The time eects for the years i = 1995 N
b
; : : : ; 1995 are estimated im-
plicitely by assuming that the sequence of estimated time eects 
i
; i = 1975; : : : ; 1995
is uncorrelated with B(t) = B
1
+ B
2
(t) and therefore with each power of t up to N
b
.
These N
b
+ 1 restrictions are incorporated into the denition of the orthogonalized
year dummies Y D
1975
; : : : ; Y D
1995 N
b
 1
. The orthogonalization implies that B(t) is
estimated as if no cyclical eects were present in the regression. Thus, B(t) can be
interpreted as the trend component and the orthogonalized remaining time eects as
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the business cyclical component. In the empirical application, we choose a fth order
polynomial in time for B(t) (N
b
= 5), which seems to yield a satisfactory decomposition
of trend and cycle.
The hypothesis of uniform insider wage growth requires equation (6) to hold against
a more general alternative, whereas the (stronger) uniform wage growth hypothesis
additionally requires the coecients of K
a
to be zero. Formally, it is also possible to
test the hypothesis that the cohort eects K
b
are zero. But this test of equation (7)
for older cohorts is not directly based on the entry wages of these cohorts. Instead, it
relies on the implications of the hypothesis for the wage prole in later stages of the
life{cycle.
In order to formulate a test of the hypothesis of uniform insider wage growth, we
consider in the derivative g

the following interaction terms of age and time:
t; t
2
; 
2
t; 
2
t
2
:(10)
The implied non{separable variant of g(c; ) expands (6) by incorporating the integrals
of (10) which are denoted by R
1
; : : : ; R
4
. For instance, R
1
is dened as follows:
R
1
=
Z
(c+ )d = (c
2
=2) + (
3
=3) :(11)
Consequently, the most general formulation of equation (8) becomes
g(c; ) + u
t
= G + (A
1
 K
1
)+ (B
1
+K
1
)t+A
(2)
() +B
(2)
(t)(12)
+(1   )K
b
(c) + K
a
(c) +
4
X
i=1

i
R
i
+
1995 N
b
 1
X
i=1975

i
Y D
i
:
A formal test of the uniform insider wage growth hypothesis is:
H
UI
: R
1
; : : : ; R
4
do not appear in g(c; )(13)
and the test of the stronger hypothesis of uniform wage growth is:
H
U
: R
1
; : : : ; R
4
do not appear in g(c; ) and K
a
= 0 :(14)
Only if the separability condition H
UI
holds, is it meaningful to construct an index of
a life{cycle wage prole as a function of pure aging and a macroeconomic trend index.
Otherwise, a dierent wage prole would apply for each cohort. Thus, provided H
UI
holds, the life{cycle (L) is given by
ln[w
L
()] = (A
1
 K
1
)+A
(2)
()(15)
and the macroeconomic (m) wage trend index is given by
ln[w
m
(t)] = (B
1
+K
1
)t+B
(2)
(t) :(16)
When interpreting these indices, it is important to recognize that neither the level
nor the coecient on the linear term are identied in a strict econometric sense. In
fact, identication relies on the assumption that the coecient on the linear cohort
term is equal to zero. This assumption is motivated by equation (5) { provided it is
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justied in light of the data { which allows to decompose wage growth into a pure
age and a pure time eect which are both common to all cohorts in the labor market.
In light of this condition, setting the linear cohort term to zero is quite natural. If,
for instance, also entry wages grow at the same rate as the time eect b(t) before and
during the sample period, the entire cross{section prole f(; t) exhibits purely parallel
shifts over time, a situation, one would not naturally characterize by \cohort eects".
When uniform insider{wage growth is accepted, our notion of a cohort eect requires a
situation where the dierences in starting points of the common life{cycle prole dier
from the macroeconomic wage growth experienced by the cohorts in the labor market.
4.4 Quantile Regression Approach
The literature typically investigates movements in mean log wages based on least
squares (or tobit for the case of censoring) estimation procedures. This allows one to
measure how the mean of the conditional wage distribution diers across workers with
dierent socio{economic characteristics and how that mean changes over time. How-
ever, it is also of great interest to measure within{group dierences and their movement
over time. Another group of more descriptive studies, see among others OECD (1996),
describes the time trends in quantile dierences of wages for some broadly dened
groups of workers (like full{time working males or females) in order to analyze trends
in wage dispersion on a fairly aggregated level. However, it is rarely analyzed whether
within{wage dispersion diers across workers with dierent characteristics.
Quantile regressions, developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), provide a very use-
ful tool to study wage dierences across and within groups of workers with dierent
socio{economic characteristics and how they evolve over time. In this respect, quantile
regressions combine the two approaches outlined in the previous paragraph. In addi-
tion, quantile regressions exhibit certain robustness properties due to the insensitivity
of empirical quantiles to outliers in wages and the fact that they can be extended to
the censored case without losing their robustness properties, see Powell (1986). Since
the data used in this study are topcoded, i.e. wages are censored from above, we now
introduce the notation for censored quantile regressions.
For general  2 (0; 1), we estimate conditional quantiles of wages
q

(ln[w
i;t
]jc; ; 

) = g

(c; ; 

) + u

t
;(17)
where q
;t
(ln[w
i;t
]jc; ; 

) denotes the {quantile of the wage in cohort{age{cell (c; )
( cohort{year{cell (c; t) where t = c + ). The vector 

comprises the coecients
in equation (12) relating to the set of regressors x
i;t
( powers of c;  and t; year
dummies). In the empirical analysis, we model the following quantiles:  = 0:2; 0:5; 0:8
(20%{, 50%{, and 80%{quantile).
We use a simplied minimum{distance approach suggested among others by Chamber-
lain (1994)
10
for the estimation of quantile regressions when the data on the regressors
can be grouped into cells and censoring is not too severe. The approach consists of
10
See Gosling et al. (1996), MaCurdy and Mroz (1995), Fitzenberger et al. (1995), and Fitzenberger
(1999) for studies using this approach.
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calculating the respective cell quantiles in a rst stage and regressing (by weighted
least squares) those empirical quantiles, which are not censored, on the set of regres-
sors in the second stage. For the dataset used in this study, the cell sizes are large
enough for making this a fruitful approach (Chamberlain suggests cell sizes of at least
30). However, we do not estimate the 80%{quantile for males in skill group (H) since
censoring is too severe in this case. When applying the minimum{distance approach,
we use the cell sizes as weights, but we do not attempt to weight the cells eciently
using an estimate of the variance of the empirical quantile. Available estimators of the
variance within cells typically require an i.i.d. assumption within the cell, which wo do
not nd credible, and an estimate of the density at the quantile under investigation.
The standard error estimates are robust with respect to the weighting procedure (see
the next subsection).
4.5 Block Bootstrap Procedure for Inference
In the context of this study, we allow for the error terms being dependent across individ-
uals within cohort{year{cells and across adjacent cohort{year{cells. The dependence is
assumed to take the form of rectangular m{dependence across time and across cohorts.
We use a exible Block Bootstrap approach allowing for standard error estimates which
are robust against fairly arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error
term, see Fitzenberger and MaCurdy (1996). The Block Bootstrap approach employed
here extends the standard bootstrap procedure in that it draws blocks of observations
to form the resamples. For each observation in a block, the entire vector comprising the
endogenous variable and the regressors is used, i.e., we do not draw from the estimated
residuals. We draw a two{dimensional block of observations of block length eight in the
cohort and six in the time dimension with replacement until the resample has become
at least as large as the resample size.
11
Accordingly, standard error estimation takes
account of error correlation both within a cohort{year{cell and across pairs of cohorts
and time periods which are at most seven years in the cohort dimension and ve years
in the time dimension apart.
For the weighted least squares estimation based on cell quantiles, we simply draw the
blocks of at most 48 cohort{year{cells to form the resample. In addition to the cell
quantile and the regressor vector, each cell also has a weight attached (number of
workers) which is used in the weighted least squares regression on the resample. When
the design matrix for a resample becomes rank decient (this happens frequently with
dummy specications) the resample is dismissed. Contrasting the results presented
in section 5 with conventional standard error estimates (the latter are not reported
here) indicates that allowing for correlation between the error terms within and across
cohort{year{cells (when forming the blocks) changes the estimated standard errors
considerably. Thus, it is very likely that such correlation is present and important for
inference. In the absence of a clear cut decision rule about the choice of blocksize, we
experimented somewhat with slightly smaller or larger blocks without changes in the
substance of the results.
11
When resampling, we draw new blocks until the size of the resample is equal to or larger than the
respective sample.
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5 Empirical Results
Based on the empirical framework introduced above, this section discusses the esti-
mated specications and then presents the empirical results.
5.1 Estimated Specications for Wage Equations
Depending on the degree of uniformity in wage growth imposed, we estimate ve spec-
ications (model 1 to 5) of equation (12) for the 20%{, 50%{, and 80%{quantile for
males, full{time working females, and part{time working females by skill groups (U),
(M), and (H). The high degree of censoring allows only estimation for the 20%{ and
the 50%{quantile in the case of high{skilled (H) males.
The estimation results of the preferred nal specications for the several subgroups
can be found in tables 1{3 (for gures and tables see appendix). The standard error
estimates are obtained by a block bootstrap procedure as described in section 4.6. We
will postpone the discussion of the dierences between the nine settings to the section
describing the preferred specications by means of graphical illustrations.
The most general specication (model 1) is given by
g(c; ) = G + a
1
 + a
2

2
+ a
3

3
+ b
1
t+ b
2
t
2
+ b
3
t
3
+ b
4
t
4
+ b
5
t
5
+
b2
c
2
b
+ 
b3
c
3
b
+ 
a2
c
2
a
+
4
X
j=1

j
R
j
;(18)
where the age polynomial is of order 3, the time polynomial of order 5, and c
b
= (1 )c
and c
a
= c are the cohort terms before and after 1975. All specications include the
cyclical year dummies Y D
i
which are orthogonalized with respect to the time trend.
For part-timers we include the share of females working less than half full{time hours
(klh) and its interactions with the linear terms of age (klh  a) and time (klh  t).
Models 2 to 5 are restricted versions of model 1:
Model 2: 
j
= 0 for j = 1; :::; 4 (H
UI
imposed),
Model 3: 
j
= 0 for j = 1; :::; 4, and 
a2
= 0 (H
U
imposed),
Model 4: 
j
= 0 for j = 1; :::; 4, and 
a2
= 0 (H
U
imposed), and 
b2
= 
b3
= 0, and
Model 5: 
j
= 0 for j = 1; :::; 4, and 
b2
= 
b3
= 0.
Models 2 to 5 impose separability of wage growth into age and time eects. Model 3
sets cohort eects after 1975, and model 5 cohort eects before 1975 to zero.
The most restricted version, model 4, assumes that wage growth is uniform across co-
horts, both during and before the sample, i.e. there are no \cohort eects" for those
cohorts entering the labor market before the start of the sample in 1975. Under this
scenario, wage growth can be described by a xed cross{section age prole of wages
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which moves in parallel fashion over time. Thus, the cross{section age prole corre-
sponds to the true life{cycle prole experienced by each cohort. In this situation, we do
not consider cohort eects to be operating, which motivates the identifying assumption
that the linear cohort eect in models 1 to 5 is arbitrarily set to zero and therefore can
be completely ascribed to the age and time proles. However, while for males model
4 is typically not justied by the data this is { to our great surprise { always the case
for females.
In contrast, model 3 restricts wage growth to be uniform across all cohorts only during
the sample period. Wages of new cohorts entering the labor market grow at the same
rate as wages for older cohorts apart from life{cycle eects. Nevertheless, it is possi-
ble that cross{section age proles of wages change over time due to \cohort eects"
before the start of the sample. Model 2 allows \cohort eects" to operate both for the
cohorts entering the labor market before and during the sample period. However, it
still restricts wage growth to be uniform across cohorts after having entered the labor
market.
Model 5 allows cohort eects to occur only for workers who entered the labor market
during the observed time span. In this model, entry wages after 1975 do not grow
according to the estimated time trend, that means only younger cohorts experience
cohort eects.
To test the wage growth hypotheses H
UI
and H
U
we carry out a sequence of Wald tests.
Starting from model 1, we test consecutively whether models 2 to 5 provide a sucient
description of the data. These test results determine the preferred models which are
reported in tables 1-3 and which the illustrations of wage proles in the following
subsection are based upon. Analogously building on the preferred specications, we
calculate several tests investigating uniformity of the preferred coecient estimates
across quantiles (available upon request).
Turning to the results for the uniform wage growth hypotheses (H
UI
and H
U
), i.e. test-
ing the restrictions implied by models 2, 3, 4 (and 5 for high{skilled males) we nd
that in general model 1 is always rejected by the data. Consequently, we take sepa-
rability of age and time eects in all cases as given. In the following, it is therefore
possible to construct life{cycle wage proles and macroeconomic time trends for all
groups considered.
For men of skill group (U), model 3 is appropriate with cohort eects operating dur-
ing the sample period for those who have entered the labor market before the sample
period. Men of skill group (M) t better in model 2. So (M){workers who started work-
ing before and during the sample period experience cohort eects during the observed
time span. Men of skill group (H) are best represented by model 5 (whith a quadratic
cohort{term for younger males and the cohort{terms for older men dropped). This
means that alike men of the medium{skill group there are cohort eects during the
sample period at work for the younger men who have entered the labor market dur-
ing this time. The aforementioned models apply to all estimated quantiles within the
respective cells of skill groups (for high{skilled males only 20%{ and 50%{quantiles).
That means, as far as males are concerned, cohort eects { which lead to parallel
shifts of the life-cycle earnings prole over time { do exist, and entry wages of younger
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medium{ and high{skilled males who started working during the observation period
do not simply dier across cohorts by the estimated time trends.
Unexpectedly the opposite is true for full{time and part{time employed females for
whom we do not nd any cohort eects.
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In this case model 4 is the preferred model
and applies to all quantiles. It is especially surprising that for women, in particular for
women who started working during the observed 21 years, cohort eects are nonexis-
tent. In our empirical framework the skill upgrading of females starting in the sixties
and seventies seems to have no impact per se on female wages. Put dierently, it is
possible that composition and selection eects interfere, which we have not controlled
for yet. Composition{ and selection eects are likely in the case of females, because
their employment patterns and labor market attachment has changed very much dur-
ing the last three decades. Because we interpret the nding of cohort eects for the
younger medium{ and high{skilled men entering the labor market after 1975 as eects
of skill upgrading in a basically stable male employment setting, it is obviously neces-
sary to control for composition and selection eects of changes in female employment
in further research from a labor demand perspective. It could also be the case that
women of the same skill level but dierent ages are much closer substitutes compared
to males. In the case of perfect substitutability it is plausible to nd no cohort eects.
To complete the results on model specication, we have tested whether the quantile
regression estimates dier signicantly by quantiles. We mostly nd signicant dier-
ences even though these dierences are often not economically meaningful. Instead of
providing many test statistics (these test results are available on request), we choose
to present this aspect by means of graphical illustrations of our preferred estimated
models accross quantiles in the next subsection. This way, we can directly emphasize
the economically important dierences.
5.2 Graphical Illustrations
In the following, we present graphical illustrations of the preferred estimated models
corresponding to the test results presented in the previous subsection. These graphical
illustrations (see appendix) prove convenient to describe the ndings of this paper.
First, since uniform insider wage growth (H
UI
) is accepted for all specications, it is
meaningful to construct proles of life{cycle wage growth and time trends. Then, we
analyze male{female wage dierentials in estimated time trends in order to investigate
to what extent full{time and part{time working women were able to improve their
wage positions compared to men.
Life{Cycle Proles
Figures 5 and 6 depict the predicted life{cycle proles for males and for full{time and
part{time working females. The graphs show men compared to full{time{ and men
12
Computation with pooled data for part-time and full-time females exhibited signicant cohort
eects. In contrast, visual inspection of tted cross section proles contradicted cohort eects because
life{cycle proles for given cells were quite constant over time.
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compared to part{time working women. The graphs for older high{skilled men at the
50%{quantile and older high{skilled full{time women at the 80%{quantile should not
be taken too seriously because cells are censored in these cases. Therefore the predicted
proles for higher ages are to be viewed as out{of{sample predictions.
Comparing low{skilled (U) men and women it becomes apparent that the life{cycle
proles of full{time working women are much atter and even negative in the lower
part of the wage distribution. For low{skilled men, the distribution does not change
very much over the life{cycle. At all quantiles, wage growth is nearly identical with
the lowest quantile a little ahead which points to a compression of the within cell
distribution. Low{skilled full{time women experience in general very little growth of
under 10% over their life{cycle. The lowest quantile ends at 55 years where it started
at the age of 25 being negative in between. The within cell distribution of low{skilled
female full{timers enlarges to a dierence of only 10% between the 20%{ and the
80%{quantile at the end of the life{cycle. In contrast, the within cell distribution of
low{skilled part{timers becomes more compressed over the life{cycle. The prole of
the 80%{quantile is stable over time at 0%, the 50%{quantile grows by 5% and the
20% quantile by 10% until the age of 55 years. Put together, for male and female
low{skilled workers wage inequality is nearly stable over the life{cycle. It increases
very little in the case of full{time women and decreases both for males and part{time
females. The wage growth is in general relatively weak with a maximum of nearly 20%
for the 20%{quantile of males and female part{timers.
The picture changes when we look at medium{skilled (M) workers. The life{cycle
wage growth of men is much higher than for women and reaches 32%, 45%, and 60%
(20%{, 50%{, and 80%{quantile) implying a rather strong rise in within{cell inequality
of wages over the life{cycle. A similar rise of inequality is observable for female full{
timers due to a surprisingly strong downward movement of the 20%{quantile in this
case, summing up to around 20% at the age of 55. The median gains around 10%
and the upper quantile 20% which is in both cases one third of male gains. Part{
timers proles are the attest (a nding which is quite plausible taking into account
the presumably lower rate of human capital accumulation of part{timers) with only
marginal dierences between the 80%{quantile and the median. Both reach 10% at
the end of their working life. Noteworthy is again the comparatively strong growth
of 20% in the lower part of the distribution which leads to decreasing inequality of
wages in this cell similar to what we found already for low{skilled female part{timers.
The opposite is observable in the case of medium{skilled males and full{time working
medium{skilled females. In both cases, we nd a dierence between the 20%{ and the
50%{quantile of around 30% at the age of 55 years. Very surprising are the losses of
20% faced by the 20%{quantile of full{time women. The dierence in wage growth
over the life{cycle between the 20%{quantiles of full{time working men and women
then sums up to 50% at the age of 55.
The nding of losses over the life{cycle in the case of medium{ as well as low{skilled
female full{timers at the 20%{quantile contrasts sharply to the 20%{quantile of part{
time women (for low as well as medium skill level), for whom we observe the highest
(but small) gains within the respective cells. Most likely this result reects selection
and composition eects. First, interrupting employment for individual reasons is cer-
tainly \cheaper" for females in the lower part of the wage distribution in terms of lost
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earnings. Second those women may be threatened disproportionately by unemploy-
ment because of comparatively high wages in this part of the skill distribution. Third,
it is possible that employers are more likely to dismiss low{skilled married females with
low wages than other employees. All together, this could lead to a higher probabil-
ity of interruptions for those females and therefore to a severe depreciation or loss of
human capital that can not be catched up again. On the one hand, part{timers, who
accumulate less human capital of this kind, may have a more stable work career than
full-time employed females in the lower part of the wage distribution. On the other
hand, women working full{time when they are young might switch disproportionately
to part{time employment when they are older. As a composition eect, this enhances
the human capital endowment of part{time women at a higher age. If no such addi-
tional eects where operating, then the observed losses in the lower part of the wage
distribution would have to be interpreted generally as decreasing returns to experience
or that experience depreciates more quickly than it is built up in the case of low{
and especially medium{skilled full{time working women. Considering the reasons why
the prole at the 20%{quantile looks so badly, one may suspect in addition that the
unobserved quality of the group suers over the life{cycle.
Now turning to high{skilled (H) women (part{timers and full{timers) and men, we nd
that women always exhibit a positive growth which ends at 55 years at around 20%
for the 20%{quantile, at around 30% for the 80%{quantile, and 40% respectively 50%
(for part{timers) for the median. This implies decreasing within cell wage inequality
between median and 80%{quantile. For high{skilled part{timers, the wage distribution
is most unequal in the middle of the life{cycle and becomes more equal again after an
age of 40 years. As far as men are concerned, it becomes obvious that the estimation
of the 50%{quantile can not be interpreted after age 35. The reason for this somewhat
peculiar course of the 50%{quantile is the fact that almost all medians above the age
35 are censored. At the 20%{quantile, we observe a strong growth of 55% which is even
stronger than the growth of the most successful parts of both female wage distributions
in skill group (H).
All together we conclude: Life{cycle wage growth of women is always lower compared
to males of comparable skill level. We also nd that life{cycle wage growth diers
substantially between female full{ and part{timers of skill groups (U) and (M) leading
to dierent movements of within cell distributions. While the 20%{quantile of low and
medium{skilled full{timers exhibits negative growth, the 20%{quantile of part{timers
grows strongest within the respective cells with the former leading to increasing, and
the latter to decreasing within cell inequality. The increase in inequality in the case of
medium{skilled full{timers is even stronger than for medium{skilled males.
Time Trends
Figures 7 and 8 depict the estimated time trends without cyclical eects based on the
preferred nal specications. Based upon the acceptance of the uniform wage growth
hypothesis, these time trends summarize the shifts in the wage distribution within and
between the sill groups over time and entry wage growth in settings for which K
a
= 0
is accepted. The latter is always the case except for medium{ and high{skilled males
(see tables 1-3 appendix). The estimated time trends are used to show graphically the
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changes in male{female wage dierences for given characteristics of the employees over
the time period from 1975 to 1995.
A rst glance at the gures reinforces the impression we got already from the uncon-
ditional wage distributions. Men and women experience rather dierent wage trends
over time and there are further dierences between full{time and part{time working
females as well as across skill groups. With the exception of high{skilled part{timers,
women of all skill groups at all quantiles experience a stronger wage growth than their
male counterparts.
Males in skill{group (U) show a more unequal trend in wages since the middle of the
1980's resulting in a gap of 10% in the year 1995. The lower part of the distribution ends
up at 10%, the upper part at 20%, and the median somewhere in between. The time
trends are quite dierent for low{skilled female full{ and part{timers. Their endpoints
are nearly 10% higher, and for full{timers the distribution becomes more compressed
over time. Since about 1985 part{timers experience a widening at the upper end and
a compression at the lower end of the distribution. Full{ as well as part{time working
women make on average nearly the same gains until 1995 but have clearly a stronger
wage growth than males.
Skill{group (M): The macro trend of men does not involve a lot of change in inequality
since all quantiles move in more or less the same way. The opposite occurs in the case
of full{time females. Here we detect a catching up of the lower part of the distribution,
resulting all together in a 35% wage growth until 1995. In the upper part a widening
of 2-3% is visible over time ending at 23% and 25% for the 50%{ and 80%{quantiles in
1995, respectively. Part{time working females experience neither widening nor shrink-
ing of wage inequality between the median and the 80%{quantile wheras the distance
to the 20%{quantile grows. Since the beginning of the 1980's, the within cell wage
distribution becomes more unequal. Despite this development, part{timers exhibit a
steeper time{trend than males and a slower growth than full{time females.
Turning now to the high{skilled (H) males and females, results are again limited by
censoring. What we can conclude is that inequality of within{wages grows between the
20%{ and 50%{quantile for men and stays constant in the case of full{time women.
The gains (around 15%) are similar for the male median and all quantiles of female full{
timers. Part{time women of skill{group (H) exibit a very unusual time trend involving
compression of wages from the lower part of the distribution and losses at the median
and in the upper part of the distribution. Because high{skilled female part{timers
are a comparatively small group, interpreting their time trends is dicult. Individual
reasons for high{skilled females to be part{time employed (leaving aside child rearing),
are hard to nd in a context of human capital arguments. Possibly they can aord
working part{time because of their higher income or possibly they choose to work in
specic sectors like education (or the public sector in general), where part{time jobs
are more easily to get.
Another look at gures 5 and 7 as well as 6 and 8 (right hand sides) contrasting
female life{cycle proles and their time trends uncovers some interesting facts. While
life  cycle growth of low and medium{skilled full{timers is lowest in the lower part
(20%) of the within cell wage distributions, it proves to be highest over time for those
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females. Quite the opposite is observable for low{skilled and medium{skilled part{
timers. While the 20%{quantile exhibits the lowest (or low in comparison to other
quantiles of the respective cells) growth over time, it gains most over the life  cycle.
Finally, we would like to summarize graphically the improvement of female wages
compared to male wages by comparing the time trends of males and females of the
same age and skill group. For this purpose, we have calculated relative dierences
of male and female time trends which we have studied separately so far. Full{time
working females of skill group (H) are compared to males of skill group (M) because of
the severity of censoring for high{skilled males. Furthermore we do not discuss female
part{timers of skill group (H) because of the irregular trends in this case.
All graphs (see gure 9) show basically the same pattern, namely a general improve-
ment of the female wage position which amounts to at least 10, and to at most 27%.
Another impressive result which we have already discussed regarding the unconditional
distributions and life{cycle proles is that the largest gains are mostly to be found at
the 20%{quantiles. In particular, this is true for low{skilled part{timers (19%) and
full{timers (22%) and for medium{skilled full{timers (27%). Medium{skilled part{
timers in the lower part (20%{quantile) of the distribution, despite the larger gains at
the other quantiles within that cell, catch up by 14%. The trends at the other quantiles
by skill levels are rather complex. At the median, medium{skilled part{timers are most
successful. Here, median growth is stronger than the growth at the other two quantiles.
High{skilled full{timers in comparison to medium{skilled males are the least successful
of all females. Their catching up amounts to \only" 10% at average and varies only
slightly over the dierent parts of the wage distribution. As part of future research, it
has to be investigated from a labor demand perspective whether the wage gains in the
lower part of the wage distribution were associated with disproportionate job losses in
this segment of the labor market (see Hunt, 1997 for such an interpretation in the case
of East Germany).
6 Conclusions
Our goal is to provide a comprehensive descriptive analysis of the level and the dynam-
ics of the gender wage gap between 1975 and 1995 in West Germany, across the entire
wage distribution, taking into account life{cycle and birth cohort eects. We prefer to
investigate the entire distributions of males and females because of the shortcomings of
conventional decomposition techniques which only \explain" dierences in mean wages
and therefore overlook the important changes in the other parts of the distribution. A
decomposition of mean wage dierences may lead to wrong interpretations since dis-
tributional and compositional eects can possibly be confounded. Therefore, we use
quantile regressions to separate the dierent eects and trends for dierent quantiles
of the wage distribution, skill levels, cohorts, and employment status.
In this paper we mainly adressed the question how wages dier between male and
female workers and between dierent skill groups over the life{cycle and over time.
Life{cycle wage growth of women is always lower compared to males of comparable
formal skill level. Life{cycle growth for part{timers is in general lower than growth for
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full{time employed females. This nding ts perfectly the conventional human capital
perspective. Nevertheless, as an exception, life{cycle wage growth diers substantially
between low{skilled and medium{skilled female workers in full{time and part{time jobs
leading to dierent trends of within cell distributions of wages. While the 20%{quantile
of low and medium{skilled full{timers exhibits negative growth, the 20%{quantile of
part{timers grows strongest.
The nding of negative life{cycle growth at the lowest quantiles of medium{ and low{
skilled full{time employed females may in general be attributed to dierent work careers
of those females compared to females in the other parts of the distribution and to part{
time employed females. But there are several other conceivable reasons for this nding,
for example a higher risk of unemployment or a changing within cell distribution of
unobservable ability due to skill upgrading. A higher risk of unemployment would lead
to less human capital investment and stronger depreciation of human capital.
If orientations of women have changed towards a higher labor force participation and
higher formal skill levels, one should observe a narrowing gender wage gap, e.g. due
to stronger human capital investment. Such changes are likely to have a stronger
eect on regular full{time jobs compared to part{time jobs. In addition, birth cohort
eects on female wages could exist such that younger cohorts benet disportionately
from a reduction of the gender wage gap since younger cohorts have better chances
to obtain higher formal skill levels and are more work{oriented. Surprisingly and in
contrast to the hypothesis just stated, we do not nd any cohort eects for female
workers. What does that mean? Did skill upgrading really have no eects at all on
life{cycle proles of female wages? The following processes are dicult to separate:
(1) In 1995 labor force participation of females is much higher than 21 years ago. But
(2) where did participation rise? It is often stressed for Germany that the increase in
participation pimarily included part{time jobs and that the overall volume (in hours)
did not change very much. Furthermore: (3) How have females changed their labor
supply over the life{cycle (decision for children?) with which consequences for their
wages? (4) Human capital investment in formal education as well as in labor market
experience has changed, but is it also adequately rewarded? How did the rewards
change if they did so? (5) Skill upgrading of the younger cohorts leads to changes of
within cell distribution of ability. More able females move into higher skill levels where
they exert a downward shift of within ability. Within ability for low{skilled exhibits also
a downward shift over time. Are average human capital rewards within the respective
cells aected? (6) Has the risk of becoming unemployed and loosing human capital
changed because of lower average productivity? At the same time one has to take
into account that (7) the average ability of participating females has changed also,
if the formerly participating females have been a special subsample with high ability
and motivation. From stating these issues it should have become clear, what are the
topics of further research and that potential selection and composition eects have to
be controlled for.
As far as time trends are concerned, we nd that men and women experience rather
dierent wage trends over time and there are further dierences between full{time and
part{time working females as well as skill groups. With the exception of high{skilled
part{timers, women of all skill groups and at all quantiles experience a stronger wage
growth than their male counterparts. This translates into a narrowing gender wage gap
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over time. Women in part{time jobs experience a reduction in the gender wage gap to
the same extent as women in full{time jobs . The least successful are high{skilled full{
time employed women and the most successful are low{skilled and medium{skilled full{
and part{time working females especially at the 20%{quantile. Because part{timers
and full{timers have catched up to more or less the same amount, social eorts (e.g.
union policies) to improve the relative earnings of women seem to have resulted in an
improvement of the relative wage position of female workers both in regular full{time
jobs and part{time jobs, even though the latter are less institutionally regulated.
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7 Appendix
Table 1: Parameter Estimates of Wage Specications for Skill Group (U) { Males M ,
Full{Time F (F ) and Part{Time F (P ) Working Females (Standard Errors in Paren-
theses { Preferred Final Specication Only)
Skill Group (U) Low{Skilled
Quantile  = 0:2  = 0:5  = 0:8
Group M F (F ) F (P ) M F (F ) F (P ) M F (F ) F (P )
Specication (3) (4) (4) (3) (4) (4) (3) (4) (4)
Intercept 4.349 3.996 3.542 4.526 4.274 3.830 4.687 4.472 4.103
( .008) ( .032) ( .052) ( .008) ( .019) ( .048) ( .007) ( .023) ( .042)
 .178 -.106 .167 .164 .049 .101 .174 .110 .028
( .016) ( .044) ( .038) ( .010) ( .030) ( .029) ( .010) ( .027) ( .033)

2
-.043 .051 -.063 -.050 -.026 -.046 -.055 -.064 -.015
( .012) ( .031) ( .028) ( .008) ( .019) ( .018) ( .008) ( .019) ( .021)

3
.005 -.005 .008 .006 .005 .007 .007 .012 .002
( .002) ( .006) ( .005) ( .001) ( .003) ( .003) ( .001) ( .004) ( .004)
t .527 .866 .621 .710 .736 .534 .789 .709 .525
( .045) ( .163) ( .162) ( .036) ( .071) ( .091) ( .036) ( .120) ( .119)
t
2
-1.186 -1.935 -1.593 -1.867 -1.661 -1.424 -2.213 -1.680 -1.390
( .152) ( .445) ( .396) ( .104) ( .231) ( .233) ( .110) ( .307) ( .302)
t
3
1.156 2.116 1.732 2.061 1.748 1.587 2.546 1.782 1.589
( .199) ( .559) ( .487) ( .134) ( .314) ( .287) ( .145) ( .359) ( .368)
t
4
-.463 -1.008 -.755 -.945 -.774 -.690 -1.207 -.783 -.690
( .112) ( .315) ( .264) ( .074) ( .181) ( .155) ( .083) ( .189) ( .200)
t
5
.061 .173 .113 .151 .120 .101 .200 .120 .099
( .022) ( .064) ( .052) ( .014) ( .037) ( .030) ( .017) ( .036) ( .039)
c
2
b
-.058 { { -.041 { { -.047 { {
( .009) ( .008) ( .006)
c
3
b
-.011 { { -.009 { { -.011 { {
( .003) ( .003) ( .002)
c
2
a
{ { { { { { { { {
klh { { -.008 { { -.004 { { -.002
( .001) ( .002) ( .002)
klh  t { { -.003 { { -.001 { { -.002
( .002) ( .001) ( .001)
klh  a { { -.000 { { .000 { { .001
( .000) ( .000) ( .001)
a: The estimate of the covariance matrix is obtained using a Block Bootstrap Pro-
cedure (1000 resamples for skill groups (U) and (M) and (H)). The blocks allow for
dependence across six adjacent time periods and across eight adjacent cohorts.
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates of Wage Specications for Skill Group (M) { Males M ,
Full{Time F (F ) and Part{Time F (P ) Working Females (Standard Errors in Paren-
theses { Preferred Final Specication Only)
Skill Group (M) Medium{Skilled
Quantile  = 0:2  = 0:5  = 0:8
Group M F (F ) F (P ) M F (F ) F (P ) M F (F ) F (P )
Specication (2) (4) (4) (2) (4) (4) (2) (4) (4)
Intercept 4.457 4.179 3.726 4.620 4.460 3.925 4.762 4.606 4.237
( .008) ( .041) ( .071) ( .006) ( .031) ( .036) ( .015) ( .022) ( .043)
 .267 -.260 .134 .325 .166 .120 .410 .304 .068
( .014) ( .067) ( .038) ( .013) ( .038) ( .018) ( .022) ( .031) ( .034)

2
-.099 .084 -.025 -.105 -.116 -.039 -.115 -.153 .001
( .009) ( .056) ( .027) ( .008) ( .029) ( .013) ( .015) ( .024) ( .021)

3
.015 -.005 .001 .015 .024 .004 .015 .025 -.004
( .002) ( .013) ( .005) ( .001) ( .006) ( .002) ( .003) ( .005) ( .004)
t .380 .627 .510 .507 .510 .494 .711 .558 .549
( .030) ( .209) ( .148) ( .026) ( .155) ( .093) ( .074) ( .099) ( .110)
t
2
-.779 -1.504 -1.370 -1.366 -1.249 -1.352 -2.110 -1.338 -1.612
( .092) ( .595) ( .400) ( .086) ( .417) ( .202) ( .199) ( .271) ( .302)
t
3
.590 1.734 1.467 1.356 1.336 1.515 2.402 1.404 1.849
( .122) ( .743) ( .488) ( .117) ( .503) ( .245) ( .250) ( .339) ( .381)
t
4
-.134 -.832 -.634 -.533 -.582 -.669 -1.128 -.588 -.835
( .069) ( .403) ( .256) ( .067) ( .268) ( .134) ( .141) ( .187) ( .205)
t
5
-.004 .142 .096 .068 .088 .102 .186 .083 .130
( .014) ( .078) ( .048) ( .013) ( .051) ( .026) ( .029) ( .037) ( .039)
c
2
b
-.053 { { -.085 { { -.116 { {
( .007) ( .011) ( .016)
c
3
b
-.010 { { -.019 { { -.025 { {
( .002) ( .004) ( .006)
c
2
a
.020 { { .033 { { .035 { {
( .008) ( .009) ( .013)
klh { { -.006 { { -.002 { { -.003
( .003) ( .001) ( .002)
klh  t { { -.001 { { -.000 { { .000
( .002) ( .001) ( .002)
klh  a { { -.002 { { -.000 { { -.000
( .001) ( .000) ( .001)
a: The estimate of the covariance matrix is obtained using a Block Bootstrap Pro-
cedure (1000 resamples for skill groups (U) and (M) and (H)). The blocks allow for
dependence across six adjacent time periods and across eight adjacent cohorts.
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Table 3: Parameter Estimates of Wage Specications for Skill Group (H) { Males M ,
Full{Time F (F ) and Part{Time F (P ) Working Females (Standard Errors in Paren-
theses { Preferred Final Specication Only)
Skill Group (U) High{Skilled
Quantile  = 0:2  = 0:5  = 0:8
Group M F (F ) F (P ) M F (F ) F (P ) M F (F ) F (P )
Specication (5) (4) (4) (5) (4) (4) (5) (4) (4)
Intercept 4.723 4.509 4.125 4.885 4.687 4.404 { 4.872 4.665
( .009) ( .050) ( .176) ( .007) ( .026) ( .098) ( .011) ( .112)
 .520 .338 .038 .283 .489 .293 { .682 .385
( .030) ( .061) ( .198) ( .048) ( .052) ( .107) ( .045) ( .078)

2
-.161 -.167 -.025 .226 -.230 -.044 { -.447 -.155
( .024) ( .062) ( .134) ( .091) ( .047) ( .083) ( .042) ( .061)

3
.017 .024 .013 -.204 .036 .000 { .084 .022
( .006) ( .017) ( .028) ( .050) ( .011) ( .018) ( .010) ( .013)
t .215 .516 1.166 .417 .478 1.254 { .630 .432
( .086) ( .343) ( .847) ( .054) ( .152) ( .427) ( .192) ( .454)
t
2
-.765 -1.056 -3.223 -1.199 -1.021 -4.230 { -2.089 -1.587
( .299) ( .965) ( 2.237) ( .188) ( .481) ( 1.243) ( .668) ( 1.144)
t
3
.834 .642 2.890 1.417 .773 4.580 { 2.605 1.468
( .399) ( 1.141) ( 2.671) ( .264) ( .630) ( 1.522) ( .849) ( 1.388)
t
4
-.337 -.011 -.898 -.651 -.170 -2.058 { -1.313 -.477
( .226) ( .593) ( 1.447) ( .155) ( .352) ( .810) ( .459) ( .754)
t
5
.043 -.050 .064 .102 -.005 .332 { .232 .040
( .045) ( .112) ( .288) ( .032) ( .069) ( .155) ( .089) ( .149)
c
2
b
{ { { { { { { { {
c
3
b
{ { { { { { { { {
c
2
a
.019 { { -.020 { { { { {
( .011) ( .011)
klh { { -.010 { { -.007 { { -.007
( .003) ( .002) ( .002)
klh  t { { -.003 { { .004 { { .004
( .002) ( .001) ( .002)
klh  a { { -.002 { { -.002 { { .000
( .001) ( .001) ( .001)
a: The estimate of the covariance matrix is obtained using a Block Bootstrap Pro-
cedure (1000 resamples for skill groups (U) and (M) and (H)). The blocks allow for
dependence across six adjacent time periods and across eight adjacent cohorts.
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Figure 1: Aggregate Trends of Levels and Growth Rates of Log Real Wages
1975 { 1995
Males, Full{Time Employed Females, Part{Time Employed Females
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Figure 2: Unconditional Growth of Log Real Wages by Skill{Level
1975 { 1995
Males
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Figure 3: Unconditional Growth of Log Real Wages by Skill{Level
1975 { 1995
Full{Time Employed Females, Part{Time Employed Females
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Figure 4: Dierences of Unconditional Growth of Log Real Wages by Skill{Level
1975 { 1995
Females, Full{Time Employed { Males
Females, Part{Time Employed { Males
30
Figure 5: Life{Cycle Proles of Wages by Skill{Level
1975 { 1995
Males and Full{Time Employed Females
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Figure 6: Life{Cycle Proles of Wages by Skill{Level
1975 { 1995
Males and Part{Time Employed Females
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Figure 7: Time Trends of Wages by Skill{Level
1975 { 1995
Males and Full{Time Employed Females
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Figure 8: Time Trends of Wages by Skill{Level
1975 { 1995
Males and Part{Time Employed Females
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Figure 9: Dierences in Estimated Time Trends by Skill Level
1975 { 1995
Females, Full{Time Employed { Males
Females, Part{Time Employed { Males
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